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Artigo
Trends in South American weapons purchases  
at the beginning of the new millennium 
Tendências para as compras de armas na América do Sul  
no início do novo milênio
RAfAel DuARTe VillA*
JuliAnA ViggiAno**
In recent years, with some frequency it is heard that Latin America, especially 
South America, is witnessing the rise of an arms race. Frequent reports in the press 
and strong statements made by politicians in the region have fueled this fear1. 
At the same time, scholars have also reached to this conclusion, as pointed out by 
Malamud and Garcia: “The famous arms race in Latin America, led by Venezuela, 
is no longer just talk.”2
This paper is divided into three parts. At first, the paper offers a brief historic 
overview of military spending in Latin America, emphasizing South America’s 
last decade. In the following section, the longest of them all, an analytical map 
of military spending on armaments in six South American countries (Venezuela, 
Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Peru and Argentina) is presented, giving special attention 
to what kind of weapons is being purchased, from whom they are being purchased, 
and which are the factors that motivate and allow such purchases. Finally, the paper 
seeks to identify trends for the second decade of the new millennium. Although this 
paper analyzes data referent to the first decade of the 2000s, particular attention 
is placed to the period 2003–2007, since it represents a turning point in arms 
purchases for South American countries.
* Associate professor of the University of Sao Paulo (USP) (rafaelduvi@gmail.com).
**  PhD professor of the Federal University of Santa Catarina (UFSC).
1 In late 2006, the President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, in response to the purchase of weapons by countries like 
Venezuela and Chile, said that the region was entering in an arms race period. References to news on the subject 
can be found at: Downie, Andrew, Time World, “A South American Arms Race?”, Friday, December 21, 2006. 
Available at <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1697776,00.html>, accessed August 23, 2011; 
The Economist, “South America defence: speak fraternally but carry a stick”, May 29, 2008; Oppenheimer, “Just 
what Latin America needs – a new arms race”, Miami Herald, September 17, 2007; p. 16A; Jorge Marirrodriga, 
“Latino américa se rearma” (Rearmament in Latin America), El País, April 29, 2006; Casto Ocando, “Planea 
Venezuela una compra récord de armamentos” (Does Venezuela plan a big purchase of arms?), El Nuevo Herald, 
September 16, 2006. April 2006.
2 Malamud, C. Encina Garcia, C. “Rearmament or renovation of military equipment in Latin America”, 
Working Paper 31/2006, Real Instituto Elcano, available at <http://realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/283.
asp>, accessed August 25, 2009.
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Introduction (setting the context)
Military expenditures in Latin American countries (that is, countries 
geographically situated in both South and Central America) amount to 
US$ 60.4 billion (in 2007 constant prices) in 20103. From 2003 to 2007, 
expenditure of this nature increased at an annual rate of 6%, a low amount if 
compared to other regions of the world. The analyzed data indicates a pattern of 
spending during the first decade of the millennium: In South America, military 
expenditure constantly grew while in Central America numbers remained virtually 
constant. The lowest spending year in South America (1999) accounted for 86% of 
the region’s expenditure; the highest-spending year (2007) accounted for 97%. It is 
important to underline once again, however, that these figures are still quite low if 
compared to other so-called peripheral regions of the international system such as 
Asia and the Middle East, and are incomparable to the huge amount of resources 
allocated by “first world” regions like North America and Western Europe. In 
Latin America, South American countries are responsible for the largest increases 
in military spending during the 2003–2007 period, Venezuela (78.53%), Chile 
(53%), and Ecuador (49%) being the main responsible countries. It is also in 
South America where are the countries with higher military budgets in the region: 
Brazil, which accounts for 46% of expenditures; Colombia, which accounts for 
15%; and Chile, with 13%.4 South America alone accounts for US$ 39.6 billion 
of the US$ 44 billion invested in the military in 2007. What could explain such 
an increasing pattern during the mentioned years? The rise of military spending 
coincides with a series of three consecutive years of strong economic growth 
in South America (2004–2006, at an average rate of approximately 5.3%)5, 
a phenomenon experienced last in the 1970s, when average rates were close 
to 7%. Although growth had declined in 2007 to 4.9%, some of the strongest 
economies, like Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela, maintained their rates 
considerably high: 8.7%, 5.3%, 5.1%, and 8.4%, respectively6. On the other 
hand, the positive economic performance was also accompanied by an increase 
in macroeconomic indicators in almost all major countries in this sub-region: 
3 See: SIPRI, “Military expenditure by region in constant US dollars, 1988–2010, available at <http://www.
sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/worldreg2011/worldregtable11/view>, accessed December 22, 
2011. This number can vary depending on the source, but in general the figures are not far apart.
4 For all these data, see: Stalenheim, C.; Perdomo, C. & Skons, E. “Military Expenditure”, in SIPRI Yearbook 
2008. Armament, disarmament and international security. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 200.
5 For this information, see: Centro de Proyecciones Económicas da Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL) 
(Center of Economic Projections of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), 2006.
6 Estado de São Paulo Online, “PIB da Argentina cresceu 8,7% em 2007, diz Cristina Kirchner” (Argentina’s 
GDP grew 8.7% in 2007, says Cristina Kirchner), December 2, 2008. Available at <http://www.estadao.com.br/
economia/not_eco122970,0.htm>, accessed August 27, 2011; Dinheirama, “Alta do PIB, a Selic e o crescimento 
do Brasil” (The rise of the GDP, the Selic rate and Brazilian growth), available at <http://dinheirama.com/
blog/2008/03/14/alta-do-pib-a-selic-e-o-crescimento-do-brasil/>, accessed August 27, 2011.
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inflation, fiscal adjustments, and public debt reduction, combined with high flows 
of foreign capital that had an impact on dollar devaluation policies.
Based on that, some experts have interpreted South America’s interest in 
increasing military spending over the past five years as the result of high levels of 
economic growth, a stronger currency due to the devaluation of the dollar – which 
stimulates import practices –, and political will to modernize the armed forces of 
the sub-region, which have obsolete arms stockpile7.
Notwithstanding, is it enough to claim an arms race in South America based 
on the fact that there is an increase in investment numbers? Indeed, reactions 
coming from some countries may suggest a movement in that direction, raising 
concern about this possibility; for instance, Colombia concerns with Venezuela’s 
arms purchases, particularly regarding uncertainty about the “ultimate consumers” 
of such products. Thus, the Colombian government has come to favor mechanisms 
for monitoring Venezuelan arms purchases8. Bolivia and Peru have also expressed 
concern with increasing on armaments spending by Chile. As points out a study 
by Gustavo Gutiérrez, “[…] military expenditure, measured in US dollars, in 
relation to the GDP shows […] a great amount of spending by Chile in a program 
to modernize the Army, which effectively raises suspicion and alarms its neighbors 
[…].”9 This paper, however, does not intend to discuss whether or not there is an 
“arms race” in South America, but to systematize information that can substantiate 
such debate by mapping military expenditure in countries of the region that 
maintain Armed Forces with complex structures and that purchase sophisticated 
weaponry, drawing tendencies for this entering decade.
An outlook of weapons’ purchases in South America
Since 2005, Chile and Venezuela (and, to a lesser extent, Brazil) had the 
greatest increase in weapons imports among South American countries, giving 
rise to the delicate question of whether their excessive concern with modernizing 
the armed forces could not have the negative effect of fueling an arms race in the 
region and destabilizing governments by transferring part of the acquired arsenal 
to national or regional non-state groups. The Venezuelan case has drawn the most 
attention.
7 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Caribbean and Latin America – Defence and 
economics”, in: Military Balance 2008, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 59.
8 See: Layla Ibrahim Abdallah Dawood. “Compra de rifles de assalto russos e o problema do tráfico de armamento 
de pequeno porte” (resenha) (Purchase of Russian assault rifles and the problem of trafficking in small arms” 
(book review), Conjuntura Internacional, PUC-Minas, available at <http://www.pucminas.br/conjuntura>, 
accessed September 15, 2011.
9 Gutiérrez, Carlos “Chile, Perú y Bolivia: entre el conflicto y la cooperación” (Chile, Peru and Bolivia: between 
conflict and cooperation), Sepúlveda, Isidro (ed.). Seguridad Humana y Nuevas políticas de defensa en Iberoamérica 
(New Human Security and defense policies in Latin America). Madrid: Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez 
Mellado, Madrid, 2007. p. 308–9 (our translation).
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The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published 
in the summer of 2008 its annual balance report of export, import and transfer 
of weapons around the world accounting for numbers of the previous year. 
Interestingly, for the first time, SIPRI’s report devoted a whole chapter to analyze 
the purchase and transfer of arms in South America. At SIPRI Yearbook 2008, 
emphasis is given to three countries: Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela. In a medium-
term analysis, SIPRI showed a percentage increase in arms transfers in South 
America: “States of South America accounted for 5% of the volume of international 
transfers of conventional weapons imported for the period 2003–2007 – and 47% 
higher than in 1998–2002.”10 These acquisitions could be transforming South 
America in an “emerging arms market.” For example, in the cases of Chile and 
Venezuela, the volume of conventional weapons imported from Russia and Britain 
could turn them into a market equivalent to other regions of the world such as 
North Africa. Not surprisingly, countries that export conventional weapons – 
Russia in particular – have pointed out that the economic success and obsolescence 
of weapons systems in Latin America offer good opportunities for the sale of new 
military equipment11.
Several important questions are essential to be considered when dealing with 
military spending budgets. In accordance to the methodology designed by Red 
Atlas de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL), these questions are: 
1) which countries spend on weapons; 2) what resources are being spent on; 3) why 
countries decide to spend on arms (motivation); and 4) how military expenditure 
is funded12. Answers to these questions may give a more or less dramatic tone to 
the issue of arms purchases in the region. In the next sections, South American 
countries with large military structures – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, 
and Venezuela – become the focus of attention in order to answer the first, third, 
and fourth questions above mentioned13.
There is disagreement among sources when it comes to recognize Venezuela 
as the main arms investor in South America if it is considered the relation between 
military expenditure/GDP. During the period 2000–2009 the country only 
invested 1.4% of its GDP in military expenditure. The fact is that “Venezuela has 
10 Holtom, P; Bromley, M. and Wizeman, D. “International arms transference”, in SIPRI Yearbook 2008. 
Armament, disarmament and international security. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 304.
11 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Caribbean and Latin America”, Military Balance 
2008, op. cit., p. 59.
12 See: Donadio, Marcela. “El presupuesto de defensa en América Latina. La importancia de la transparencia y 
herramientas para el monitoreo independiente” (The defense budget in Latin America. The importance of the 
transparency and independent monitoring tools), in: El presupuesto de la defensa en América Latina” (The defense 
budget in Latin America). Buenos Aires: RESDAl, 2004.
13 The amounts allocated by Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay to the armed forces were considerably low in the 
last decade; for this reason, this paper does not include them in its considerations. In the case of Ecuador, at 
the some point, its military expenditure will be of concern. Data shows that Ecuador spends one of the highest 
GDPs percentages in arms purchase in the region.
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increased dramatically its weapon imports [and] moved from 56th position in the 
period 1998–2002 to the 24th position [in the period 2003–2007], becoming 
the largest regional importer.”14 In 2007 alone, Venezuela increased its defense 
budget by 78% (reaching US$ 887 million), becoming the greatest spender in 
real terms in South America that year15. Such an amount, however, was lower 
than the amount of weapons imported by Chile in 2003–2007: Venezuela spent 
US$ 1,417 billion against US$ 2,283 billion spent by Chile. Several years of 
constant increase in oil prices, political will from President Chávez to improve 
the country’s military capabilities, and presidential will to boost Venezuela’s 
political position in the region have led the country to larger increments in its 
military capacities.
A remarkable fact is that in recent years there has been a considerable 
distance between the original military budget set and the actual yearly spending 
in Venezuela. This may explain why in 2006 and 2007 Venezuela ranked fourth 
and eighth respectively among developing countries, receiving more delivery of 
weapons and having signed more arms transfer agreements.16 The discrepancy 
between actual and expected budget spending is a consequence of legal 
mechanisms that allow additional allocation of resources to the military during 
a fiscal year. The most relevant of such mechanisms is called Paraguas Act 
(Ley Paraguas, in Spanish). This legal instrument, that dates back many years, 
allows the government to negotiate foreign loans to finance extra military 
spendings not always included in the initial budget, although the government has 
announced its intention to limit the application of the Act or even to eliminate 
it altogether.17
However, what kind of weapons is Venezuela buying and which countries 
or groups is it buying from? Between 2005 and 2007, there was a big jump in 
Venezuelan weapons purchases, estimated at US$ 4 billion, most of it coming from 
Russia. Since 2005, Venezuela has purchased from Russia 100,000 Kalashnikov 
automatic rifles AK-47, 24 Sukhoi Su-30MK fighter aircrafts, 10 MI-35 combat 
helicopters, approximately 40 Mi-17-V multitasking transport, and 3 Mi-26 
heavy transport helicopters18. In 2007, two new agreements on arms purchases 
were signed with Russia. According to these documents, Venezuela would receive 
a package of 5 Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines and possibly ground missiles 
14 SIPRI Arms Transfers Data for 2007, “SIPRI data shows drop in international arms deliveries, orders remain 
high”, available at <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/PR_AT_data_2007.html>, accessed August 8, 2009.
15 Holtom, P; Bromley, M; Wizeman, D. “International arms transference”, in SIPRI Yearbook 2008. Armament, 
disarmament and international security 2008, op. cit., p. 307.
16 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 2008, op. cit., p. 449.
17 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Caribbean and Latin America”, Military Balance 
2008, op. cit., p. 54
18 Holtom, P.; Bromley, M. &Wizeman, D. “International arms transference”, in SIPRI Yearbook 2008. Armament, 
disarmament and international security 2008, op. cit., p. 306.
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and long-range S-Type Club. Venezuela also bought in the same period from 
China 3 three-dimensional JYl radars19.
It should be noted that the trend that puts Russia as the main supplier 
of weapons to Venezuela was consolidated over the comprised years being 
considered here. From 2003 to 2007, Russia provided 93% of the weapons 
bought by Venezuela while China and Israel represent 3% and 2% of the total of 
arms imports, respectively20. In practice some of the weapons systems purchased 
from Russia supplement purchases made from China. For example, Venezuela 
probably acquired from Russia a ground-air Tor-M1 missile system. According 
to the country’s Ministry of Defense, three Chinese radars – also purchased – will 
support the functions of the Russian system and even the Sukhoi aircraft fighters. 
In sum, Venezuela in 2007 was the third largest market to Russia’s arms exports 
in the world (accounting for 5%, although this percentage is well below the 45% 
Russia exported to China and the 22% Russia exported to India)21.
The US embargo on arms transferring to Venezuela probably had the 
undesirable impact for the United States of Venezuela turning to Russia as its 
weapons supplier. In 2006, the US State Department imposed an embargo that 
prevents Venezuela from importing goods and services of Defense nature. In 
the same year, Venezuela was certified by the US government, under Section 
40A of the Arms and Control Act (AECA), as a country “not fully cooperative” 
in the fight against terrorism. The AECA certification was renewed in 2007 
and 2008. By this mechanism, Venezuela is not allowed any assistance, sale or 
financing by the US military. In practice, the US embargo on arms sales has led 
representatives of the Venezuelan armed forces to pressure the executive to look 
for alternative import markets. Several arms-producing countries are alert to 
Venezuela’s air force plans to buy other types of aircraft attached to the Sukhois 
purchased from Russia.
Actually, the result of the US arms embargo has not been much different 
than expected. Combined with Venezuelan armed forces interest in buying 
weapons, the embargo was a strong incentive for the establishment of closer 
relations between Russia and Venezuela beyond22 the commercial aspect of 
purchase/sale of weapons. During 2008, both countries took more concrete 
steps in that direction. In the first half of that year, on his third visit to Russia 
since the beginning of his presidential term, Chávez confirmed his intention to 
promote strategic partnerships with Russia including energy cooperation and 
19 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Caribbean and Latin America”, Military Balance 
2008, op. cit., p. 60
20 Holtom, P.; Bromley, M. &Wizeman, D. “International arms transference”, in SIPRI Yearbook 2008. Armament, 
disarmament and international security 2008, op. cit., p. 306.
21 Ibid.
22 Murphy, J. “US extends embargo on Venezuela”, Janes’s Defense Weekly, August 30, 2008.
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even the possibility of installing two Russian weapons factories in Venezuela23. 
In the subsequent years, new agreements on weapons (which would include the 
Su-35 and Su-39 combat aircraft; the An-74 cargo aircraft; the II-76 and Mi-
28 combat helicopters; and Kilo-class submarines) were discussed, even though 
no agreement was signed until late 200724. During these years, Venezuela also 
considered acquiring 24 Sukhoi SU-30 fighters in the BM version. Additionally, 
Venezuela signed a US$ 2 billion contract with Russia that includes the purchase 
of 4 submarines type 636, 10 Ilyushin 76MD-90 and 1 Ilyushin 78MK transport 
aircrafts, 2 tankers, and 10 attack Mil Mi-28NE helicopters. The Air Force has 
incorporated 18 training Chinese K-8 aircrafts, and the Army is in the process of 
finalizing the purchase of about 100 Russian T-72 and T-90 MBT, and wheeled 
or tracked armored troop carriers25.
This deal was followed by the announcement of the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that Russian warships would hold joint exercises with Venezuela’s 
navy, an initiative interpreted by analysts as a message to United States26. The first 
concrete step towards this “strategic partnership” was given in September 2008 
when two Russian Tu-160 supersonic bombers arrived in Venezuela to carry 
out military exercises in international waters (the first exercise of military nature 
of a Latin American country with Russia since the end of the Cold War)27.The 
Russian Defense Ministry announced, though, that after undertaking the scheduled 
training, the aircraft would return to its home base28.
At the same time, pressures from the US government on arms-producing 
countries such as Spain, Brazil, and France have also had the unintended effect 
of inducing Russia to enter on the Venezuelan market. Pressure from the US 
prevented the finalization of an agreement signed by Venezuela and Spain in the 
second half of 2005 for the purchase of two patrol boats type 10C and a 296 
CN-235 transport aircraft. The US claimed that marketing authorization was 
23 “Chávez busca aliança estratégica com a Rússia” (Chavez seeks strategic alliance with Russia), BBCBrasil, 
available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/story/2008/07/080723_chavezrussia.shtml>, accessed 
September 23, 2009.
24 For data on equipment acquired, see: Abdullaev, N.; Cavas, C. P. “Russia, Venezuela hint to submarine deal”, 
Defense News, July 16, 2007.
25 Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2009/2010 (Ranking of the Military Power in South America – 
2009/2010), available at <http://www.militarypower.com.br/ranking.htm>, accessed January 20, 2012. 
26 Jane’s Intelligence Review, “Venezuela and Russia’s message to US”, available at <http://articles.janes.com/
articles/Janes-Intelligence-Review-2008/Venezuela-and-Russia-s-message-to-US.html>, accessed September 
18, 2010.
27 Peru is another South American country with which Russia has a special interest in establishing military 
cooperation agreements. For further information, see Latin America Security & Strategic Review, “Enhancing 
military cooperation”, September 2007, p. 16.
28 According to military analysts, the Tu-160 is the largest military aircraft ever built and can carry up to 
12 cruise missiles with conventional or nuclear warheads. These Russian planes are being used in military 
exercises in Venezuela, “Aviões russos fazem exercícios militares na Venezuela” (Russian planes perform military 
exercises in Venezuela), available at <http://diario.iol.pt/internacional/russia-venezuela-avioes-bombardeiro-iol-
militares/989749-4073.html>, accessed September 23, 2010.
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required since both the aircraft and the patrol boats would be manufactured with 
technology of US origin. That same year, an agreement between the Brazilian 
company Embraer and the Venezuelan government for the acquisition of ALX 
and AMX-T Super Tucano aircrafts (a light attack training aircraft) also failed to 
be carried out due to the blocking position of the US for the same reason it had 
interfered in the transaction with Spain.29
Chile is another country that stands out in its efforts to acquire weapons of 
modern technology to re-equip its armed forces. In the period 2003–2007, Chile 
became the largest importer of (conventional) weapons in the South American 
region. Chile held the 36th position in the world ranking of weapons recipient 
in the period 1998–2002; however, during 2003–2007, the country moved to 
the 12th position (the highest position among Latin American countries30). Chile 
has also been the only Latin American country to maintain throughout the first 
decade of the 2000s its military spending above 3.5% of its GDP, except for the 
year 2007, in which it was exceeded by Venezuela.
From 2003 to 2007, Chile’s main import market for conventional arms 
was the European Union, accounting for 82% of the country’s weapons imports, 
followed by the United States, accounting for 15%, and Israel, with 3%31. As some 
analysts suggest, choosing Western countries as its main supplier can be explained 
by Chile’s intentions to acquire NATO standard military status and certainly the 
strategic partnership that the country intends to strengthen with the US in the 
coming decades in the political, economic, and military domains.32
In a short-term analysis, in 2007 Chile appears as the main South American 
importer of arms from Britain, occupying, alongside Romania, the second place 
in Britain’s list of global arms exports (9% of its total exports of weapons for both 
countries). The dynamism of Chilean arms imports was reflected in the growth 
of 23% of its military budget in 2007.33
Chilean constant level of military expenditure has been made possible by two 
circumstances. First, the country’s good economic performance in the first decade 
of the century. To illustrate, between 2004 and 2007, Chilean GDP grew at an 
average annual rate of 6.2%. Second, Chilean armed forces still benefit from the 
Copper Law, an act that dates from the 1950s34. In addition, during the Augusto 
29 Latin America Security & Strategic Review, “US moves against Venezuelan purchases elicits new challenges of 
its assumptions”, January 2006, p. 1–2.
30 Holtom, P.; Bromley, M. &Wizeman, D. “International arms transference”, in SIPRI Yearbook 2008. Armament, 
disarmament and international security 2008, op. cit., p. 305.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Caribbean and Latin America”, Military Balance 
2008, op. cit., p. 60–61.
34 In fact, the Ley del Cobre (Copper Law) dates from 1958, but it was modified in 1998 still under the 
dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet.
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Pinochet military regime, the government regulated that 10% of copper exports 
were to be directed to the funding of military equipment purchases and operational 
expenses35. It should be noted that Chile is the world’s first copper exporter and 
its commodity prices in the international market have experienced a steep growth 
over the first decade of the 2000s.36 According to some calculations, the Copper 
Law contributed, for many years, with an annual average of US$ 200 million to 
the military budget. Due to the increase in international prices, it is estimated that 
the Law alone contributes with US$ 1 billion to the military budget, leading to 
strong pressure from political and social sectors in Chile to revise or abolish the 
act. The increase of 23% in the military budget in 2007 was a preventive action 
in response to the existence of these social and political pressures emphasizing the 
need to abolish or reform the Law. These sectors advocate for military spending 
to be financed by the regular or general fiscal year budget37. In short, “[t]he key to 
the increase in Chilean military spending is the steep rise of international copper 
prices in recent years. The Copper Law implemented in 1958 and later amended 
during the 17-year dictatorship of Gen. Augusto Pinochet stipulates that the Armed 
Forces are automatically granted 10% of all sales (not profits) made by the state-
owned Codelco, the world’s biggest copper producing company.”38
In this past decade, Chile has purchased very sophisticated and technologically 
advanced weaponry. Among them, were 10 new US super-sophisticated combat 
aircraft F-16C, 18 second-hand and 18 new F16 MLU from the Netherlands39. 
Chile has also invested heavily in its navy, receiving 2 new Scorpene-class 
submarines, built by France and Spain; 2 Doorman frigates and 2 Heemskerck Van 
Holland frigates coming from the Netherlands; and in 2009 it was waiting for the 
35 According to an estimate made by The Economist, resources allocated through the “Cooper Law” got Chile 
340 tanks from Germany, 8 frigates, 2 submarines, and 28 new combat aircraft F-16. The Economist, “South 
America defence: speak fraternally but carry a stick”, May 29, 2008. Accessed October 29, 2011.
36 Chile produces 25% of world copper. By 2005, the mining industry will have contributed with US$ 6.1 billion 
for the country, or about 25% of 2005 total tax revenue. That number may be higher today because of the 
international prices of copper, which rated US$ 0.7 on average until 2003, doubled in 2005 and continued 
to grow in the following years. The international growth of copper prices also had a significant impact on the 
economies of other South American producers, particularly Peru and, to a lesser extent, Argentina and Brazil. 
Information on copper prices can be found at UniversiaKnowledge@Warten, “Preços do cobre aliviam cofres 
da América Latina” (Copper prices relieve coffers of Latin America), September 21, 2005; available at <http://
wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=1028&language=portuguese>, accessed September 5, 2008; 
ÚltimoSegundo, “Com preço maior, roubo de cobre no Brasil cresce” (With higher prices, copper stealing grows 
in Brazil), May 6, 2008, available at <http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/brasil/2008/05/06/com_preco_maior_
roubo_de_cobre_no_brasil_cresce_11_em_2007_1300233.html>, accessed September 5, 2010.
37 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Caribbean and Latin America”, Military Balance 
2008, op. cit., p. 61.
38 “Chile per capita expenditure on defence, the highest of Latin america”, MercoPress. South Atlantic News 
Agency, Tuesday, March 16, 2010, available at <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/03/16/chile-per-capita-
expenditure-on-defence-the-highest-of-latinamerica>, accessed October 24, 2011.
39 The purchase of F-16 from the United States was only made possible because the 34th Presidential Directive, 
which prohibited the sale of technologically sophisticated weapons to Latin America, was reversed in the first 
Clinton administration, in 1997. Before that, the 34th Directive was only suspended once to sell a lot of F-16s 
to Venezuela in 1983.
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arrival of 3 23-type frigates of the former Royal Navy. Chile also signed a contract 
with Germany to acquire 136 second-hand Leopard-2 tanks delivered in 2009. 
The country’s missile arsenal has also been modernized: the American AIM-9M 
Sidewinder, AIM-120 AMRAAM, Harpoon and Sea Sparrow are being acquired. 
From Israel, Chile is buying the Python and Derby missiles, as well as smart bombs 
of various calibers. At the end of the decade, Chile also incorporated 12 A-29 
Embraer Super Tucano training aircrafts and 12 new Bell 412EP helicopters 
to its military fleet. Recently, 3 batteries of air-defense system NASAMS were 
purchased, as well as about 40 8x8 armored Stryker for the Marines, 2 KC-135E 
aircrafts for transport and refueling planes, 1 4-C maritime patrol aircraft 295MPA, 
4 C-295MPA maritime patrol aircraft, and 5 Russian Mil Mi-17SP helicopters40. 
Chile ranked third among Latin American nations in military expenditure in 
2008, spending US$ 6 billion, following Brazil (US$ 23.3 billion) and Colombia 
(US$ 9.1 billion). However, on a per capita basis, Chile by far outspent both 
countries, since its population is (approximately) 17 million, compared to Brazil’s 
195 million and Colombia’s 46 million41.
In regard to Colombia, some of its politicians have raised concerns about 
the possibility of an arms race in South America, pointing out to a weaponry 
disadvantage especially in view of the recent arms purchases made by Venezuela. 
Thus, Colombia, following the steps of other South American countries, 
announced in 2008 an impressive US$ 28 billion plan to modernize its armed 
forces, giving priority to upgrade their combat aircrafts Mirage and Kfir. The plan 
also provided for the purchase of new and modern combat aircrafts, helicopters, 
and armored vehicles, and an increase in army and police personnel, estimated 
at 36,000 people42. The first step to put the plan in practice was taken in 2007 
when Colombia announced an increase in its military budget of US$ 3,370 billion 
for the following year, the largest increase in more than 30 years43. Fighting drug 
trafficking and anti-insurgent paramilitary groups was the argument used by the 
government to justify the investment on the military.
However, Colombia’s expenditures on arms purchase in terms of percentage 
of its GDP reveal a paradox. While the country has spent considerably little 
on arms purchases in the 2003–2007 period compared to its South American 
neighbors Chile and Venezuela, Colombia maintained the second highest military 
40 “Chile comprará armas a Estados Unidos por US$ 275 millones de dólares” (Chile will buy weapons to US 
by US$ 275 million), chile-hoy.blogspot.com, July 8, 2009, available at <http://chile-hoy.blogspot.com/2009/07/
chile-comprara-armas-estados-unidos-por.html>, accessed January 15, 2012.
41 “Chile per capita expenditure on defence, the highest of Latin America”, Merco Press. South Atlantic 
News Agency, Tuesday, March 16, 2010, available at <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/03/16/chile-per-capita-
expenditure-on-defence-the-highest-of-latinamerica>, accessed January 28, 2012.
42 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Caribbean and Latin America”, Military Balance 
2008, op. cit., p. 60.
43 Holtom, P.; Bromley, M.;Wizeman, D. “International arms transference”, in SIPRI Yearbook 2008. Armament, 
disarmament and international security 2008, op. cit., p. 307.
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spending in the region. The numbers for expenditure on arms purchase for the 
period (US$ 210 million) are far lower than Chile, Venezuela or even Brazil’s 
acquisitions in the same period. In fact, Colombia spent 3.6% of its GDP on 
military expenditure in 2000–2009, the highest percentage in Latin America. 
Except for Chile, which spent 3.5% of its GDP during these years, the rest of 
South American countries spent less than 2%. The main suppliers of arms to 
Colombia during the period 2003–2008 were the United States (39%), Spain 
(26.2%), Brazil (17%), Italy (5.2%), and Canada (4.5%). It is remarkable that 
Colombia is the only South American country that has in another Latin American 
country – Brazil – one of its main import markets of weapons.
To unravel the existing discrepancy between armaments purchases and a 
relatively high percentage of GDP spent on defense it is necessary to look at the 
structure of military spending funding sources. In addition to the defense budget, 
the Colombian government receives a war tax from cities and provinces (generating 
a revenue of approximately US$ 400 million a year) complemented by a new tax, 
announced in 2007, expected to enhance in US$ 43.6 billion the government 
revenue by 2010.44 Despite that, Colombia depends heavily on US military aid. 
Actually, Colombia receives the largest amount of US aid in Latin America and 
that aid is not accounted for in the military budget of each fiscal year. So Colombia 
is investing in armaments, but the source of such expenditure does not appear 
directly in the military budget. 
The US has prioritized Colombia in military assistance programs such as the 
Foreign Military Financing of the State Department, the International Narcotics 
Control and Law Enforcement, and particularly through initiatives such as Plan 
Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Strategy45. Colombia became, at the 
beginning of the new millennium, one of the main recipients of US military aid 
around the world. In the years 2003–2007, thanks to the above mentioned programs, 
US military aid to the country ranged from US$ 550 million to US$ 650 million 
per year. In other words, US military aid to Colombia is a contemporary version 
for Latin America of the “military umbrella” policy. Compared to US military 
assistance to any other country in the Southern Hemisphere, US military aid 
to Colombia is notably higher. Its impact on Colombia military structure is 
evident. For instance, much of the military equipment, including the modern 
Black Hawk helicopters, purchased by Colombia between 2000 and 2007, was 
only made possible due to US military assistance, particularly by means of anti-
narcotics programs and Plan Colombia (which, since 2000, has allocated 80% of 
44 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Caribbean and Latin America”, Military Balance 
2008, op. cit., p. 60.
45 From Plan Colombia, which began in 2000, the country received US$ 1.3 billion (75% of the assistance went 
to the army and the police). From the Andean Anti-Drug Initiative, Colombia received an amount ranging from 
US$ 465 million (in 2003) to US$ 526 million (in 2007). Data is available at Congressional Budget Justification 
for Foreign Operations. (USDS Budget, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007).
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its US$ 4.5 billion budget to military assistance, including purchases of military 
equipment). Only one lot of Black Hawks was purchased with Colombian military 
budget in the past decade46.
However, Colombia has not acquired sophisticated weaponry if compared 
to Chile and Venezuela’s acquisitions. There is not many equipment today that 
can be compared to the Sukhoi acquired by Venezuela, or the F-16s purchased 
by Chile. In recent years, Colombia acquired UH-60L Black Hawk helicopters 
and bought a Beech B-300 aircraft converted to an air intelligence aircraft, and 
various units of the Super Tucano A-29 manufactured by Embraer in Brazil. 
The Air Force bought 13 used Kfir C10 aircrafts from Israel to rebuild its fighter 
force. The Colombian government agreed to participate in the design of a new 
KC-390 transport aircraft projected by Embraer and initially intends to acquire 
up to 12 units of the model47.
Any overview of the South American region in terms of total military spending 
or spending on arms purchases must necessarily take into account the role of Brazil 
due to the increased complexity of its economy, the relative relevance of its GDP in 
the region (around 56%), and the greater complexity of their global and regional 
policy goals. Notwithstanding, in 2003–2007, Brazil reduced its international 
performance as an importer of conventional weapons. The country occupied the 
32nd position in a world rank in the period 1998–2002, and dropped to the 33rd 
position in 2003–2007. This decrease was offset by a considerable increase in 
military budget (more than 33%) in 2007, by far the most significant in a decade. 
This explains why Brazil, which occupied the 14th position in 2006 among countries 
with increased military spending, and rose to the 12th position in 200748. Brazil 
occupied, in 2010, the 30th position in the world ranking of weapons importers. 
“However, the elect Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has delayed awarding a 
US$ 2 billion contract for advanced combat aircraft and a US$ 6 billion contract 
for frigates and offshore patrol vessels (OPVs).”49
However, attention must be paid to the fact that Brazilian military spending of 
nearly US$ 70 billion in the period 2003–2007 is diluted by the size of its economy: 
for 2007, the country’s GDP was around US$ 1.5 trillion (or R$ 2.5 trillion50). 
Taking into account the relation military spending/GDP, Brazil spends little 
on defense (1.6% of its GDP) when compared to Colombia (3.5%) or Chile 
46 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, available at <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_db.html>, accessed 
January 24, 2012.
47 Military Power Review, “Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2009/2010” (Ranking of the Military 
Power – 2009/2010), available at <http://www.militarypower.com.br/ranking.htm>, accessed November 21, 
2011.
48 Stepanova, Ekaterina. “Trends in armed conflicts”. SIPRI Yearbook 2008, p. 12.
49 Holtom, Paul et al. “Trends in international transfers, 2010”. SIPRI Fact Sheet. SIPRI, 2001, p. 5, available 
at <http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=421#>, accessed March 18, 2012.
50 IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatísticas), “Brasil em sínteses”, available at <http://www.ibge.
gov.br/brasil_em_sintese/default.htm>, accessed September 20, 2011.
40
Rafael DuaRte Villa; Juliana Viggiano
(3.5%), and only slightly more than Argentina (0.96%) and Peru (1.3%). In the 
period 2003–2007, on average, 1.5% of Brazil’s GDP were directed to military 
expenditure. It should also be taken into account, however, that in spite of defense 
budget growing an average 15% between 2004 and 2007, only 4% of the budget 
can be allocated to new equipment acquisitions and armament upgrade. The rest 
of the budget is spent primarily on military personnel, including expenses with 
pensions. Therefore, the actual spending in equipment and weapons upgrade in 
the period 2003–2007 was of US$ 818 million, lower than Chile’s and Venezuela’s 
investments.
Figure 1. Military expenditure by country as percentage of GDP from 1998 to 2009.
Source: according to SIPRI database (2011).
Regarding the institutional aspect, Brazil does not have any extra-budget 
mechanisms like Chile, Colombia and Venezuela. The military budget is based 
on the Budget Act (Lei Orçamentária, in Portuguese) approved by the National 
Congress annually. The Budget Act, however, allows regular military budget to be 
complemented throughout the year. For 2010, R$ 1.5 billion (US$ 853 million) 
from the Budget Act was allocated to the Ministry of Defense to improve the 
existent airspace control system and to develop airport infrastructure.51 Along with 
many other countries in the region, Brazil has in recent years started on a program 
to modernize and upgrade its armed forces. The 2008 National Defense Strategy 
announced plans to boost Brazil’s military capabilities and to invigorate its domestic 
arms industry through a series of acquisitions which includes significant volumes 
51 Freeman, Sam P. et al. “Military expenditure”. SIPRI Yearbook 2011. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011, p. 71.
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of technology transfer. In 2010, in a first step towards implementing the National 
Defense Strategy, the National Congress approved a project to restructure the 
armed forces that foresees the creation of a Joint General Staff to work under the 
authority of the Ministry of Defense. In this same direction, a draft proposal to 
Brazil’s first Defense White Paper was issued in 2011. According to this document, 
every four years the government will have to submit to the National Congress 
detailed information on its defense policies and strategies along with plans to a 
continued modernization of the armed forces52.
The Brazilian Navy plans to purchase at least 33 modern ships by 2025 in 
order to make patrolling of maritime boundaries more effective. However, some 
projects, such as the development of the Brazilian nuclear submarine, have been 
delayed to meet more pressing demands such as the modernization of existing 
ships. Thus, in 2006 a further postponement of the project (which had its first 
impulse almost 30 years ago) was announced and the Navy stated its intentions 
to give priority to the modernization of the existing Type-209 submarine and 
the construction of a submarine (Type 214) using German technology. In any 
case, the nuclear submarine project received a strong stimulus when the Brazilian 
government announced in mid-2007 its plan to invest US$ 1 billion over an eight-
year period in buying German and/or French technology for the construction of 
a reactor, which is linked up to the submarine project.
The Brazilian Air Force has experienced lack of resources just as the Navy. 
For instance, the Ministry of Defense produced an ambitious project in 2002 
called the FX Project, reissued in 2007. The project proposes to buy initially 
36 modern aircraft fighters, reaching more than 100 by 2020, to replace the 
outdated Mirage, the AMX attack and tactical F-5BR that Brazil maintains53. At 
the end of the decade, the Brazilian Air Force received the first batch of the three 
acquired Russian attack Mil Mi-35M helicopters. The Air Force has also ordered 
4 more units of the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter, plus 8 units of CASA C-295 
transport aircrafts, and signed a contract with Embraer to purchase 28 units of 
the new KC-390 transport aircraft54.
In October 2008, the Air Force announced the three finalists companies – 
all of which are Western55 – competing to provide the new generation of combat 
aircrafts to the Brazilian military. A contract for their acquisition would be signed in 
52 Ibid.
53 Military Power Review, “Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2005/2006” (Ranking of the Military 
Power in South America – 2005/2006), available at <http://www.militarypower.com.br/ranking.htm>, accessed 
November 21, 2011.
54 Military Power Review, “Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2009/2010” (Ranking of Military 
Power in South America – 2009/2010), op. cit., accessed November 21, 2011.
55 These companies are: the Swedish Saab Gripen, the French Dassault Rafale and the US Boeing F/A-18E/F 
Super Hornet. Stratafor¸ “Brazil: Momentum builds for Defense Reform”, October 2, 2008, available at <http://
www.stratfor.com/analysis>, accessed October 4, 2011.
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2009 and delivered in 2014. Thanks to that, the Ministry of Defense would see its 
budget increased for a long time. For that, an important decision should have been 
taken in 2009, when the National Budget Act would provide US$ 50.2 billion for 
the Defense. Of this total, US$ 10.9 billion is to be allocated for direct investment 
in the Army, Navy and the Air Force56.
From 2003 to 2007, Brazil bought most part of its weaponry from the 
European Union (64%), followed by the United States (17%) and Canada 
(7%)57. Some analysis suggests that it is not by chance that Brazil, like Chile, has 
given preference to Western suppliers, with special interest in NATO members, 
rather than Russia or China. That would be a deliberate selection, following a 
rationality involving “strategic choice”: its emergence as a regional power in the 
next decade does not seem to predict a relationship of rivalry with the West, but 
on the contrary, a partnership for regional security plans58. It should be noted, 
however, that due to domestic political conditions and financial difficulties, Brazil 
has bought second-hand weapons. Thus the country bought 12 used Mirage 2000C 
from France, which were delivered into three batches of 4 aircrafts in 2006, 2007 
and 2008. From Spain, the country bought 12 new C-295M transport aircrafts, 
which were delivered by the end of 2008, and 2 Lockheed P-3 Orion aircrafts 
set up for maritime surveillance. Brazil also acquired 9 F-5E aircrafts from Saudi 
Arabia and has a project to purchase 240 Leopard 1A5 tanks to the Army (having 
already received the first two lots)59. From the Brazilian private company Embraer, 
the government has purchased 50 Super Tucano EBM-314 training and combat 
aircrafts and, to cater to the Army, signed a contract to purchase 2,044 units of 
armored wheeled transport VBTP, now dubbed Guarani, in different versions.
There are two other South American countries that have important regional 
armed forces in the region and have shown willingness to modernize its military 
structures in the coming years: Peru and Argentina. The case of Peru, whose former 
president Alan Garcia announced in 2007 plans to invest over US$ 1 billion in 
modernizing the armed forces60, is of particular importance since, following Brazil, 
Peru is the country that has numerically the largest armed forces in South America61.
56 Alencastro, Catarina & Jungblu, Cristiane. “Novo plano de defesa nacional prevê serviço militar obrigatório 
para mulheres” (New plan of national defense provides compulsory military service for women), O Globo/
Reuters, available at <http://bf2brasil.com/forum/showthread.php?p=676863>, accessed September 22, 2011.
57 Holtom, P.; Bromley, M.; Wizeman, D. “International arms transference”, SIPRI Yearbook 2008. Armament, 
disarmament and international security 2008, op. cit.
58 Stratafor¸ “Brazil: Momentum builds for Defense Reform”, October 2, 2008 (translated by authors), available 
at <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis>, accessed May 10, 2011.
59 Military Power Review, “Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2009/2010” (Ranking of the Military 
Power in South America – 2009/2010), available at <http://www.militarypower.com.br/ranking.htm>, op. cit., 
accessed December 1, 2011.
60 Military Balance 2008, “Caribbean and Latin America”, op. cit., p. 61; see also: Cruz, Tantalean C. “Peru’s 
updated plan shifts focus”, Janes’s Defense Weekly, October 10, 2007, p. 31.
61 Military Power Review, “Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2005/2006” (Ranking of the Military 
Power in South America – 2005/2006), op. cit., accessed December 12, 2011.
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Peru’s military spending in the period 2000–2009 remained almost constant, 
on an average 1.4% of its GDP, and its military budget virtually coincided the 
original expected expenditures with its real one. Figures show that Peru is one of 
South American countries with lower spending numbers on arms imports. That 
can be explained by two situations: the many severe economic crises that affected 
Peru in the past decade, and the decision to buy a small number of sophisticated 
weaponry, at least during the period 2003–2007. The country acquired in 2007 
two used Lupo class frigates and expects two more from the Italian Navy. Up to 
now, Peru has no (public) plans to acquire sophisticated military weapons in the 
short term. Thus, as only 30% of its combat aircrafts are in operational conditions62, 
priority falls on maintenance and modernization of weaponry bought in the 1980s 
and 1990s, especially the IKL 209/1200 submarines and the French Mirage 2000. 
Peru also signed with Russian companies an agreement to maintain operational 
their Mig-29 and Mi-17 fighters, and their An-32 helicopters63. Peru acquired 
two Fokker 60 MPA maritime patrol aircrafts from the Netherlands inventory 
in order to strengthen fight against the Shining Path guerrillas. The government 
also ordered 8 new Russian attack helicopters Mil Mi-35P, and 6 Russian Mil 
Mi-17SP for transportation. This probably means that Peru will continue to make 
efforts for keeping markets that in the past have been suppliers of its advanced 
weaponry, especially France and Russia. Peru, contrary to the case of Brazil, Chile 
and Venezuela, is not facing its imports market as “strategic choices,” but as a 
commercial safe choice.
However, following the trend of several South American countries (especially 
Chile and Venezuela64), Peru uses its natural resources sales as a source of military 
funding. In its efforts to modernize the armed forces, Peru created a defense fund 
in 2005 subsidized by income derived from the exploitation of hydrocarbons65 
(especially from gas). Thus, given the excellent oil prices in the international 
market, part of the designed modernization program of the Peruvian armed 
forces is expected to be funded during the second term of president Alan Garcia 
(2007–2011). Income from armed forces properties will provide complementary 
funding.66
62 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Caribbean and Latin America”, Military Balance 
2008, op. cit.
63 Military Power Review, “Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2005/2006(Ranking of the Military 
Power in South America – 2005/2006), op. cit., accessed September 18, 2011.
64 Bolivia is another country that has announced its intentions to allocate natural resource revenues from gas 
sale in military spending. In 2007 an official proposal to allocate 2% to 3% of such an income to modernize the 
armed forces was made. (Buranauskas, T. “Bolivian military to get additional funding to finance revitalization”, 
available at <http://emarketalerts.forecast1.com/mic/eabstract.cfm?recno=130472>.
65 SIPRI, “Military expenditure of Peru”, available at <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>, accessed 
November 18, 2011.
66 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), “Caribbean and Latin America”, Military Balance 
2008, op. cit., p. 61.
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Argentina, on the other hand, is a curious case. No doubt the country 
represents one of the most vigorous cases of political and economic development in 
South American region at present. However, even though during Nestor Kirchner’s 
administration (2003–2007) macroeconomic indices suggested an average growth 
of over 8% a year, Argentina presents low levels of military expenditure (in 2008, 
it reached a floor of 0.8% of the GDP, against 1.1% in 2000) and has not stated 
any future plans for major investments in military equipment67. Thus, Argentina 
experienced a decrease of 1.6% in its military budget in 2004, losing the position 
of fourth biggest military spender in the region that it occupied then. Similar rates 
of decrease during the next following two years (2005 and 2006) made Argentina 
lose further positions in the regional military ranking, especially to Peru and 
Colombia68. For the period 2000–2009, in terms of military spending/GDP, 
Argentina’s military budget, compared to other South America countries, was only 
greater than Paraguay, which allocated an average 0.9% of its GDP. It was lower 
even than Uruguay, who spent an average 1.5% of GDP in the same period. Of 
course, these figures cannot lose sight that, in absolute terms, Argentina’s budget 
is several times higher than that of Paraguay and Uruguay. One example that 
shows how the political and financial crisis during the early first decade of the new 
century negatively affected the purchase of advanced weaponry in Argentina is the 
impressive fact that the last purchase Argentina did until 2008 was a Bell-212/
UH-1N helicopter in 200069.
Clearly, besides the economic crises at the beginning of the decade, the 
memory of the violent years of military dictatorship in the country also accounts 
as an important factor in explaining why civil governments in Argentina invest so 
little in military modernization. Thus, from 2003 to 2007, Argentina acquired 
AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles, bought second-hand units of Mirage 2000C, and 
with its own technology built a Corvette, the Meko 140.70 Under the government 
of Cristina Kirchner, Argentina undertook the modernization of UH-1 helicopters 
and light attack IA-58 Pucara aircrafts, extending their operational life for at least 
another ten years. Two units of Russian helicopter Mil Mi-17V were acquired to 
undertake operations in Antarctica.71
67 CadahQueija, Lucas. “Relatório Final de Iniciação Científica: Política de defesa e investimentos militares na 
América do Sul: Brasil, Argentina, Chile e Venezuela.” (Final Report of the Scientific Initiation: Defense policy 
and military investments in South America: Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela), Universidade de São Paulo/
DCP, 2008.
68 Military Power Review, “Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2009/2010” (Ranking of the Military 
Power in South America – 2009/2010), op. cit., accessed January 26, 2012.
69 See: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, available at <http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_db.html>, 
accessed February 22, 2012.
70 Military Power Review, “Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2005/2006” (Ranking of the Military 
Power in South America – 2005/2006), op. cit., accessed August 26, 2009.
71 Military Power Review, “Ranking do Poder Militar na América do Sul – 2009/2010” (Ranking of the Military 
Power in South America – 2009/2010), op. cit., accessed January 26, 2012.
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In mid-2007, though, the government announced a more comprehensive 
modernization program of its armed forces72, including purchases from France 
(traditional supplier of Argentina in the past), Ukraine, and Russia. From France, 
Argentina intends to acquire second-hand Mirage 2000 C/Ds and Mica and Exocet 
missiles; from Ukraine, an An-70/72 transport aircraft to replace the old C-130. 
These purchases were, however, by the end of the first decade, still a plan, and it 
seems that Cristina Kirchner’s government will further postpone the modernization 
project of Argentinean military.
In short, Chile was the largest import of conventional weapons in 2006–2010 
and the 12th largest in the world, and the total volume of transfers to the region 
increased by nearly 150%. Venezuela’s arms imports are likely to remain high in 
the next years. Other states in South America, including Argentina, Colombia, 
and Peru are engaged in more modest efforts. Orders for Brazil arms imports 
increased by 436% between the periods 2001–2005 and 2006–2010, driven in 
large part by licensed production deals with France for 4 Scorpene submarines, 
1 SBNR and 50 EC-725 helicopters73.
Conclusion: trends to the next decade
A new report of SIPRI, published in 2011, states that weapons imports to 
South America during the 2005–2006 period rose by 150% compared to the 
2000–2004 period. SIPRI attributes this strong rise to high prices of commodities, 
such as soybean, oil, and cooper. The three South American countries that have 
bought more weapons during the first decade of the new millennium were Chile 
(13th in the world ranking), Venezuela (17th in the world ranking), and Brazil (30th 
in the global ranking)74.
However, despite economic factors being an important parameter to explain 
the weapons imports, the information and data presented and analyzed in this paper 
suggest several more complex trends about modernization of the armed forces and 
South American military build-up in the first decade of the 2000s:
Almost all South American countries announced large military plans to 
modernize and reform its armed forces, necessarily implying an increase in spending 
on the medium-term. That suggests military spending should increase over the 
next ten years75.
72 Barragan, J. M.; Higuera, J. “Buenos Aires announces forces funding boost” Janes’s Defense Weekly, October 
31, 2007.
73 Holtom, Paul et al. “Trends in international transfers, 2010”. SIPRI Fact Sheet, op. cit., p. 5–6.
74 Information quoted from “Chile per capita expenditure on defence, the highest of Latin america”, MercoPress. 
South Atlantic News Agency, Tuesday, March 16, 2010, available at <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/03/16/
chile-per-capita-expenditure-on-defence-the-highest-of-latinamerica>, accessed January 24, 2012.
75 This conclusion coincides with the argument of Hodge, Natham. “FIDAE 2008 highlights: continuing 
upsurge in Latin American procurement”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 3, 2012.
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Almost all South American countries have initiated a recapitalization of its 
obsolete military stockpile, dated in its majority to the 1950s to 1960s, being the 
most modern ones from the 1980s. This recapitalization aims solely to update and 
replace old military equipment. Apart from the cases of Chile and Venezuela, other 
South American countries intend to upgrade their equipment, and the purchase of 
second-hand transportation units and weaponry seems to be the preferred choice 
due to financial constraints. Spending in 2010 was 42% higher in South America 
than in 2002, and military spending increased significantly in 7 of the 10 South 
American countries, including countries relatively less influent in regional affairs 
like Paraguay (16%) and Peru (16%), with low military expenditure through the 
first decade of the millennium76.
South American countries with major military capability (specifically Chile, 
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela) benefit from additional mechanisms to increase 
their military budget beyond the legislative stipulation for defense expenditures 
(the Copper Law in Chile, the “Umbrella Law” in Colombia, etc.). Therefore, the 
original military budget in each fiscal year rarely coincides with the real military 
spending.
There is great asymmetry in the level of arms purchases among South 
American countries: Chile and Venezuela do not represent the spending pattern 
of the region. Beyond that, almost all military institutions suffer from financial 
constraints, hence the option for purchasing second-hand equipment to be credited 
as the most viable way of funding their modernization projects.
There is a strong tendency among the Andean countries (plus Chile) to use 
their export commodities (oil, gas, and copper) to finance military spending and 
support its plans to modernize the Armed Forces and their military equipment.
South American weaponry market is no longer predominated by the United 
States. EU countries such as Great Britain, Spain, Germany, and France configure 
the main import markets for weapons. Russia has an aggressive policy of weapons 
exportation towards the region but still focus most of its initiatives to countries 
such as Venezuela.
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Abstract
In recent years, with some frequency it is heard that Latin America, especially South America, is 
witnessing the rise of an arms race. Frequent reports in the press and strong statements made 
by politicians in the region have fueled this fear. At the same time, scholars have also reached 
76 Freeman, Sam P. et al. “Military expenditure”, SIPRI Yearbook 2011, op. cit., p. 184.
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to this conclusion, as pointed out by Malamud and Garcia: “The famous arms race in Latin 
America, led by Venezuela, is no longer just talk.”
Keywords: South America; military purchase; military spending; trends. 
Resumo
Recentemente, com certa frequência, tem-se ouvido que a América Latina, em especial a América 
do Sul, tem testemunhado o surgimento de uma corrida armamentista. Relatos frequentes à 
imprensa e fortes declarações feitas por políticos da região têm alimentado esse receio. Ao 
mesmo tempo, estudiosos também têm chegado à mesma conclusão, tal como salientaram 
Malamud e Garcia: “A famosa corrida armamentista na América Latina, liderada pela Venezuela, 
já não é apenas discurso.” 
Palavras-chave: América do Sul; aquisições militares; gastos militares; tendências.
